The EMALS Disaster
The US Navy's new $13 billion USS Ford aircraft carrier (CVN-78) is a disaster. (pictured below) It cost almost twice as much as the proven Nimitz class, yet it cannot reliably launch and recover aircraft. This occurred because the Navy incorporated experimental systems that were not proven after years of research, development, and testing. They were still in development when the Ford began construction, but Admirals decided to install them anyway and hope for the best. The Navy didn't even begin launch tests with aircraft ashore using the new Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) until after construction of the Ford commenced!
Navy Captain Stephen Tedford, program manager for the Navy’s Aircraft Launch, Recovery and Equipment Office, dismissed a 2014 GAO report that raised concerns over data showing EMALS failed every 20 launches ashore, which should have halted construction of the second Ford class ship (CVN-79). Tedford offered a rambling excuse that reliability was never a requirement and cannot be proven anyway:
“Reliability comes from a significant number of cycles on any system, it is statistics-based,” Tedford said. “So you have to have hundreds of thousands of cycles in order to achieve system reliability. And the way that reliability growth is established is, it’s not just from the system installed at Lakehurst, it’s in combination with the ship and the second ship of class, and the third ship of class over time. So it was never in our program, as a requirement or anything else, in order to meet threshold reliability for either system when the ship delivered, simply because it is not possible to get there statistically.”
The Navy began funding EMALS in 1995 and contractor General Atomics began testing this launch system in 2004. When a test aircraft ashore at Lakehurst fails, a "soft launch" occurs and the aircraft just rolls down the runway, and not off the bow of a carrier at sea. It has improved since 2014 so one out of every 240 launches fail, which would roll an aircraft into the ocean due to a lack of speed needed to take-off. This means each deployed Ford class carrier would lose two $80 million aircraft each month! The old steam system fails to launch only once a decade, resulting in a cold cat launch, (video here). Crewmen die since aircraft like the C-2 and E-2 have no ejection seats, although ejecting into the sea in front of a huge aircraft carrier is often fatal. This was so alarming that the Association of Naval Aviation called EMALS a disaster!
When carrier crewmen saw the four 300 foot long launch tracks on the Ford they were stunned. How can this mass of electrical cables used by EMALS function for months on an aircraft carrier deck at sea? (pictured partially uncovered at a test facility) Hot engine exhaust, heavy rain, saltwater spray, spilled fuel and fluids are sure to erode things, and this quickly became evident aboard the USS Ford. President Trump was briefed last year by officers while aboard the USS Ford. He promptly made a confusing announcement during a Time magazine interview that the Navy must return to steam catapults, something Admirals have refused to say knowing the political firestorm this would cause. News outlets mocked Trump's knowledge of aircraft carrier launch systems because even military reporters cannot grasp how dysfunctional our Navy's procurement system has become.
There may also be a problem with EMALS power since the Navy has never demonstrated the launch of an aircraft fully loaded with bombs, missiles, and extended range fuel tanks, even ashore at Lakehurst. The failure of the Ford program has been discussed often in Navy Matters blog, where insiders expressed concern that all four launchers are connected to the same electrical system. In order to repair one catapult, all four must be shut down for an hour or more, whereas the four steam catapult systems operate independently. This means a mighty $13 billion aircraft carrier may shut down for hours during a battle as sailors attempt to fix an electrical short, because it takes an hour just to spool down the system and restart it. Some say aircraft fluids interfere with magnetic fields and each massive electromagnetic pulse at launch may damage ship and aircraft electronics while sending out a beacon that enemy ships can detect hundreds of miles away. Last year, the Pentagon's DOT&E responsible for program reviews noted:
“Poor or unknown reliability of the newly designed catapults, arresting gear, weapons elevators, and radar, which are all critical for flight operations, could affect the ability of (the carrier) to generate sorties, making the ship more vulnerable to attack, or create limitations during routine operations...Based on current reliability estimates, CVN 78 is unlikely to be able to conduct the type of high-intensity flight operations expected during wartime.”
There are 3200 crewmen aboard the USS Ford since last year (pictured repairing the new EMALS) and its future is uncertain as the Navy pushed its first overseas deployment back until 2021! It was launched in 2013, commissioned in 2017, and launched and recovered several aircraft to suggest problems were fixed, although it has not attempted to launch aircraft laden with bombs and extended range fuel tanks. The excuse is that software is buggy. In 2017 the ship's captain proclaimed this has been resolved but the same news report noted doublespeak: "The fix is a software upgrade for the EMALS what won’t be installed until 2019, during the ship’s post-shakedown availability. Until then, launching aircraft is not restricted, but not any with heavy fuel or bomb loads."
Our Navy loves to brag about its high-tech, but claims it will take two years to download a vital software update? This ship is not deployed, so even if this must be done pierside, why not do that now, rather than stall another year? This sounds like yet another group of Navy leaders evading a major embarrassment by kicking the EMALS can down the road until they retire or transfer. The accepted excuse is that the Navy has no choice but to fix EMALS. However, EMALS is not broken! It is performing as best it can and may not improve! If the Navy began launching dozens of heavy aircraft a day, reliability is likely to worsen!
Stop the Madness
The second ship in the failed Ford class (CVN-79) is 75% complete and construction of the third (CVN-80) began last year. Despite this ongoing disaster, the Navy is pouring more fuel on the fire. In March 2018, the Navy requested that contractors provide cost saving figures to support a plan to begin construction of the fourth carrier sooner! This is based on irrational optimism that serious design problems can be solved soon, after 14 years of development and testing. This is madness since EMALS is unreliable and crewmen continue to identify major changes needed in the Ford design. Moreover, the Navy may be forced to admit to a massive mistake and spend a couple billion dollars to rip the first two carriers apart and install steam catapults!
It is past time for good members of Congress and officers in the Navy to stop this madness. The Navy can finish the CVN-79, but funding for CVN-80 and CVN-81 must be delayed until the Navy resolves the Ford disaster. Initial construction of CVN-80 began in August 2017, which should be suspended, while the Ford's EMALS software update is done this summer. She just returned to the yards earlier than planned to repair newly disclosed problems, and will remain there until 2019. EMALS and other systems must improve and demonstrate reliability to the DOTE before construction of CVN-80 resumes. The Navy will develop plans for a new class of aircraft carrier in case this fails next year. This new carrier design will be based on the Ford class, but with proven steam catapults and changes to other equipment that failed on the USS Ford.
Hopefully, the problems with the USS Ford can be resolved soon, and changes identified can be incorporated into CVN-80/81, like a hundred more berthing spaces. In addition, the Ford is scheduled for a "shock" test in 2019 that may reveal the need for more modifications. If EMALS problems remain at the end of 2018, Admirals must plan for a new class of aircraft carrier to begin with CVN-80/81. Meanwhile, carrier construction funding can be diverted to another problem, the shortage of carrier aircraft. It makes no sense to build ultra-expensive aircraft carriers and send them overseas short of needed aircraft. This common sense solution must be implemented immediately.
Carlton Meyer editorG2mil@Gmail.com
Feb 2022 Update
Plans to deploy the USS Ford overseas this fall have been altered. It was just announced that it will remain under control of the 2nd Fleet (a training command) and cruise only the Atlantic with a smaller air wing. They hope for a regular deployment in 2024. The Navy's goal is to keep unfixable problems hidden until the other three carriers are complete, lest Congress stop funding them.
The most criminal event occurred in 2019 when
it was obvious there were serious problems with the Ford design that may be
unfixable. Admirals pressed Congress to fund two more Fords earlier than
planned, as though they wanted to get them under construction before Congress
and media learned about problems.
Jan 2022 Update
After years of delay, it was just revealed that the $14 billion USS Ford and her three sister ships under construction will not be able to reliably launch and recover aircraft. This was just released from the Pentagon testing office, but not reported on by ourmajor media:
"It also said that during
8,157 takeoffs and recoveries through last year, the carrier’s new
electromagnetic catapult system made by General Atomics demonstrated a
reliability of 272 launches “between operational mission failure,” or
“well below” its required 4,166. Similarly, its system to snag landing
aircraft demonstrated a 41-landing reliability rate “well below the
requirement of 16,500,” the testing office said."
Jan 2021 Update
Navy Admirals have insisted that EMALS was working great for the past three years, although they no longer released detailed statistics on EMALS performance aboard the USS Ford. Now this from a leaked Pentagon test.
"Behler’s assessment covered 3,975 launches and landing operations on the Ford during 11 at-sea, post-delivery trials from November 2019 through September 2020. The electromagnetic-powered catapult system is supposed to operate 4,166 “cycles,” or launches, between operational mission failures. Instead, it went 181 cycles between failures, or “well below the requirement,”
read a great deal about this issue, the problem seems to be rail alignment. The
tolerances for EM systems are tight. They work well ashore and in calm seas, but
even in moderate seas the carrier begins to flex unpredictably and the rails
misalign constantly by just a few millimeters. The software is unable to
properly manage the launch power and the results are unpredictable. This affects
the Ford's elevators too.
The USS Ford's
"post shakedown" maintenance period was extended from three to six
months, then to a year. It recently returned to sea for tests, and her first deployment
has been delayed
yet again, now planned for 2024. Jul
Jul 2018 Update
The new, fully crewed USS Ford will now spend a year in the yards to fix serious problems. Her first deployment has been delayed yet again, now planned for 2022.
Feb 2019 Update
The Pentagon's DOTE "test and evaluation" office released its 2018 year end summary of major weapon's systems. Relevant EMALS highlights:
• The DOT&E assessment of CVN 78 remains consistent with previous assessments. Poor or unknown reliability of systems critical for flight operations including newly designed catapults, arresting gear, weapons elevators, and radar, could affect the ability of CVN 78 to generate sorties. Reliability of these critical subsystems poses the most significant risk to the CVN 78 IOT&E timeline.
• Testing to date involved 747 shipboard launches and demonstrated EMALS capability to launch aircraft planned for the CVN 78 Air Wing.
• Through the first 747 shipboard launches, EMALS suffered 10 critical failures. This is well below the requirement of 4,166 Mean Cycles Between Critical Failures, where a cycle represents the launch of one aircraft.
• The reliability concerns are exacerbated by the fact that the crew cannot readily electrically isolate EMALS components during flight operations due to the shared nature of the Energy Storage Groups and Power Conversion Subsystem inverters onboard CVN 78. The process for electrically isolating equipment is time-consuming; spinning down the EMALS motor/generators takes 1.5 hours by itself. The inability to readily electrically isolate equipment precludes EMALS maintenance during flight operations.
A few hours later, the Pentagon announced a $15 billion contract for more Ford class carriers.