Afghanistan Expert Writes |
I was one of the last American citizens to have spent a great deal of time in Afghanistan. I was first there in 1993, providing relief and assistance to refugees along the Tajik border, and in this capacity have traveled all along the border region between the two countries. In 1998 and 1999, I was the Deputy Program Manager for the UN's mine action program in Afghanistan. This program is the largest civilian employer in the country with over 5,000 persons clearing mines and unexploded ordnance. In this later capacity, I was somewhat ironically engaged in a "Holy War," as decreed by the Taliban, against the evil of landmines; and by a special proclamation of Mullah Omar, all those who might have died in this effort were considered to be "martyrs"-- even an "infidel" like myself. The mine action program is the most respected relief effort in the country, and because of this I had the opportunity to travel extensively without too much interference or restriction. I still have extensive contacts in the area and among the Afghan community and read a great deal on the subject. Who is our enemy? Well, our enemy is a group of non-Afghans, often referred to by the Afghans as "Arabs" and a fanatical group of religious leaders and their military cohort, the Taliban. The non-Afghan contingent came from all over the Islamic world to fight in the war against the Russians. Many came using a covert network created with assistance by our own government. OBL (as Osama bin Laden was referred to by us in the country at the time) restored this network to bring in more fighters, this time to support the Taliban in their civil war against the former Mujehdeen. Over time, this military support along with financial support has allowed OBL and his "Arabs" to co-opt significant government activities and leaders. OBL is the "inspector general" of Taliban armed forces; his bodyguards protect senior Talib leaders and he has built a system of deep bunkers for the Taliban, which were designed to withstand cruise missile strikes (uhm, where did he learn to do that?). His forces basically rule the southern city of Kandahar.
This high-profile presence of OBL and
his "Arabs" has, in the last two years or so, started to generate a
great deal of resentment on the part of the local Afghans. At the same time
the legitimacy of the Taliban regime has started to decrease as it has failed
to end the war, as local humanitarian conditions have worsened and as
"cultural" restrictions have become even harsher. It is my
assessment that most Afghans no longer support the Taliban. Indeed, the
Taliban have recently had a very difficult time getting recruits for their
forces and have had to rely more and more on non-Afghans, either from
During the Afghan war with
the Soviets, much attention was paid to the martial prowess of the Afghans.
The Afghans, while never conquered as a nation, are not invincible in battle.
A "good" Afghan battle is one that makes a lot of noise and light.
Basic military skills are rudimentary and clouded by cultural constraints that
no matter what, a warrior should never lose his honor. Indeed, firing
from the prone is considered distasteful (but still done).
Traditionally, the Afghan order of battle is very feudal in nature, with
fighters owing allegiance to a "commander" and this person owing
allegiance upwards and so on and so on. Often such allegiance is secured
by payment. And while the Taliban forces have changed this somewhat, many of
the units in the Taliban army are there because they are being paid to be
there. All such groups have very strong loyalties along ethnic and tribal
lines. Again, the concept of having a place of "honor" and
"respect" is of paramount importance and blood feuds between
families and tribes can last for generations over a perceived or actual
slight. That is one reason why there were 7 groups of Mujehdeen fighting the
Russians. Many larger coordinated
attacks that advisers tried to conduct failed when all the various Afghan
fighting groups would give up their assigned tasks (such as blocking or
overwatch) and instead would join the assault group in order to seek glory. In
comparison to Vietnam, the intensity of combat and the rate of fatalities were
lower for all involved. As you can tell from above, it is my assessment
that these guys are not THAT good in a purely military sense and the
"Arabs" probably even less so than the Afghans. So why is it that
they have never been conquered? During their history the only events
that have managed to form any semblance of unity among the Afghans is the
desire to fight foreign invaders. And in doing this the Afghans have
been fanatical. The Afghans' greatest military strength is the ability to
endure hardships that would, in all probability, kill most Americans and
enervate the resolve of all but the most elite military units. The
physical difficulties of fighting in Afghanistan, the terrain, the weather and
the harshness are all weapons that our enemies will use to their advantage and
use well. (NOTE: For you military planner types and armchair generals--after
November 1st, most road movement is impossible, in part because all the roads
used by the Russians have been destroyed and air movement will be problematic
at best).
Richard Kidd |