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Subject: MCB:P 251159Z JUN
07 CG 2ND MAW ALD(uc)
RE-ADDRESSAL V-22
MAINTENANCE MEETING DISCUSSION UNCLAS VMMT 204(uc)
P 251159Z JUN 07 RE-ADDRESSAL V-22 MAINTENANCE MEETING DISCUSSION CG
2ND MAW ALD(uc)
TO
COMNAVAIRFOR SAN DIEGO CA
CC COMNAVAIRSYSCOM PATUXENT RIVER MD(UC)
COMMARFORCOM ALD(uc)
NAVAIRDEPOT CHERRY PT NC(UC)
VMMT 204(uc)
VMM 266(uc)
VMM 263(uc)
VMM 162(uc)
MALS 26(uc)
MAG 26(uc)
CG 2ND MAW ALD(uc)
CG 2ND MAW(uc)
UNCLAS
SUBJ:RE-ADDRESSAL
V-22 MAINTENANCE MEETING
DISCUSSION POC/JOHNSON,
D.J./LTCOL/2ND MAW ALD/DSN:582-3201/
HAROLD.D.JOHNSON1 AT
USMC.MIL//RMKS/1.
CONCUR WITH THE MAG-26 CO
AND THE URGENCY TO RESOLVE THESE ISSUES
IOT MITIGATE THE DEPLOYMENT RISKS.
UNCLAS
R 210939Z JUN 07 V-22 MAINTENANCE MEETING/DISCUSSION MALS 26(uc)
TO CG 2ND MAW ALD(uc)
CC COMNAVAIRFOR SAN DIEGO CA
COMNAVAIRSYSCOM PATUXENT RIVER MD(UC)
NAVAIRDEPOT CHERRY PT NC(UC)
COMMARFORCOM ALD(uc)
MAG 26(uc)
MALS 26(uc)
VMM 162(uc)
VMM 263(uc)
VMM 266(uc)
VMMT 204(uc)
UNCLAS
SIC: //N04790//
SUB:V-22 MAINTENANCE MEETING/DISCUSSION
REF/A/LTR/MAG 26/5APR07//
AMPN/REF A IS EMAIL FROM MAG-26 CO TO MALS-26 CO DIRECTING A V-22 MAG
MAINTENANCE ISSUE MEETING/DISCUSSION.// RMKS/1. PER REF A, A V-22
MAINTENANCE ISSUE MEETING/DISCUSSION WAS HOSTED BY MALS-26 ON 27 APRIL 2007.
ATTENDEES INCLUDED THE MAG/MALS/VMM COMMANDERS, AS WELL AS THEIR MAINTENANCE
OFFICERS.
OTHER ATTENDEES INCLUDED THE 2ND MAW AMO AND REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE FST
AND
BELL
BOEING. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MEETING/DISCUSSION WAS TO PRESENT FOR
ROSS-TALK, A CONSOLIDATED LIST OF HIGH PROFILE MAINTENANCE ISSUES, PRESENT
THE CURRENT OR FLEET PERCEIVED STATUS OF THESE ISSUES, COMPARE PRACTICES OR
PERCEPTIONS THAT MAY EXIST ACROSS THE MAG, AND FINALLY ASSESS THESE ISSUES
IN REGARD TO THEIR IMPACT ON OPERATIONS WHILE IDENTIFYING ISSUES THAT MAY
NOT CURRENTLY HAVE ADEQUATE SOLUTIONS.
INCREASED
UTILIZATION OF AIRCRAFT
WILL DRIVE THE REQUIREMENT FOR A MUCH MORE INTENSE LEVEL OF EFFORT TO MEET
PERATIONAL TEMPOS. FOCUS MUST BE MAINTAINED TO ENSURE AN INCREASED LEVEL F
EFFORT IS
IN PLACE
AND SUSTAINED TO ADDRESS THE IDENTIFIED ISSUES FACING THE MV-22.
2. THE FOLLOWING ARE
ITEMS OF CONCERN, IN ORDER OF PRIORITY:
A. ICE PROTECTION
SYSTEM:
1. CURRENTLY FACING NUMEROUS PROBLEMS/DISCREPANCIES WITH THE ICE
PROTECTION SYSTEM. ISSUE IS BLOCK B SPECIFIC, FLIGHT CLEARANCE RELEASED
LATE MARCH. SINCE THE RELEASE OF THE FLIGHT CLEARANCE THAT APPROVED IPS
SYSTEM USE, VMM FMC RATES HAVE BEEN DRAMATICALLY IMPACTED DUE TO THE FRAGILITY
OF THE SYSTEM. SOME PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED ARE WIRING RELATED (BENT PINS AND
CHAFFING) ALONG WITH THE CENTRAL DEICE DISTRIBUTOR AND THE BLADE DEICE
DISTRIBUTOR.
THE CDD AFFECTS EVERYTHING ON THE HEAD (DEICING, LIGHTS AND BLADE FOLD).
CDD ISSUES STEM FROM WATER INTRUSION, HARDWARE MOUNTS WEARING OUT, AND
WIRING ISSUES. BDD ISSUES INCLUDE FAILURE OF INTERNAL
COMPONENTS/CONNECTORS AND CHASSIS.
ANOTHER SIGNIFICANT ISSUE
IS BLADE HEATING ELEMENT FAILURES,
CAUSING ARCING, WHICH RESULTS IN BLADE DAMAGE.
CURRENT PROBLEMS ARE
DIFFICULT TO TROUBLESHOOT /IDENTIFY,
MANY TIMES LEADING TO
SHOT-GUNNING PARTS, ALL WITH LONG LEAD TIMES.
THE SYSTEM IMPACTS THE
TRANSFORMATIONAL USE OF THE AIRCRAFT ANYTIME/ANYWHERE.
TO DATE THE SYSTEM HAS
IMPACTED 46 A/C, ACCOUNTED FOR 17,589 TOTAL SCIR HOURS, 5,949 HOURS OF NMC AND
11,640 PMC HOURS, WITH 26 CANNIBILIZATION ACTIONS.
2. IETMS
CHANGES TO ASSIST IN TROUBLESHOOTING AND THE ABILITY TO
SUCCESSFULLY TROUBLESHOOT THE SYSTEM IS SLOWLY COMING ON LINE.
SOFTWARE CHANGES (JA2) ADVERTISED TO IMPROVE SYSTEM AND TROUBLESHOOTING. TARS
HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED, FST AND BOEING INVOLVED TRY TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS.
CURRENTLY THERE IS A LONG PROCUREMENT LEAD TIME FOR REPLACEMENT PARTS.
B. FCS/FLIGHT CONTROL COMPUTER/SWASHPLATE ACTUATORS:
1. CONTINUE TO EXPERIENCE FCF PF BIT FAILURE AND SWASHPLATE
FAULTS. FCC POSTING FAILED, PF BIT ABORTS, SUSPECT MOST OF THE
PROBLEMS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH ELECTRICAL FAULTS; SWASHPLATE ACTUATOR, PROBLEMS
CAUSED BY GLAND SEAL LEAKAGE, ROD END BEARING WEAR, AND MOISTURE INTRUSION.
FCC*S, DURING 2006 HAD 33
RETURNS: VERIFIED
5 RELAY FAILURES, 6 RPM SENSOR FAILURES. TO DATE THE SYSTEM HAS IMPACTED
132 A/C, ACCOUNTED FOR 31,627 TOTAL SCIR HOURS, 24,427 HOURS OF NMC 7,200
PMC HOURS, WITH 32 CANNIBILIZATION ACTIONS.
2. HAVING
DIFFICULTY IDENTIFYING PROBLEMS/ISOLATING FAULTS (FST
ASSISTING). DATA BUS ANALYZER IS BEING UTILIZED, HOWEVER STILL
EXPERIENCING
REPEAT GRIPES.
A BY PRODUCT OF THIS
SITUATION IS LACK OF CONFIDENCE AND ADDED FRUSTRATION DUE TO THE HISTORY OF
REPEAT GRIPES.
C. ECS - AIR CYCLE
MACHINE
1. AIR CYCLE MACHINES ARE EXPERIENCING HIGH FAILURES RATE DUE TO
DEBRIS AND DIRT INGESTION CONTRIBUTING TO PREMATURE FAILURE OF BEARINGS.
MULTIPLE ENGINEERING
INVESTIGATIONS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED.
MANUFACTURING LEAD TIME IS CURRENTLY 8-9 MONTHS, AND THERE ARE 22 IN REPAIR
CYCLE AT BOEING. CURRENT SUPPLY SUPPORT STATUS IS, THERE ARE NO
OUTSTANDING DOCUMENTS AND MALS-26 SUPPLY OFFICER HAS TWO RFI ON THE SHELF.
TO PREVENT FUTURE FAILURES
IT IS PROPOSED TO INSTALL A NEW, IMPROVED FILTER.
BELL
BOEING WILL BE INTRODUCING A SDC INLET BARRIER FILTER VIA ECP 722, DURING SEPT
08. LONG TERM FIX IS A PROPOSED
BELL
BOEING REDESIGN OF THE PITOT TUBE FILTER, NEW THRUST BEARINGS, UPGRADED JOURNAL
BEARINGS AND SEAL CHANGE.
2. THE AIR CYCLE MACHINE IS A PMC GRIPE. HOWEVER, IT WILL
NEGATIVELY
IMPACT ABILITY TO FLY IN HOT CLIMATES, AND MAY NEGATIVELY IMPACT AVIONICS
SYSTEM COOLING CREATING FURTHER READINESS DEGRADATION.
THE UNDERSTOOD CURRENT
PLAN, FOR THE PROGAM, IS TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE SPARES TO MITIGATE THE POSSIBILTY
OF HAVING LONG TERM DOWN A/C.
IF SPARE SUPPORT IS
AVAILABLE IN ADEQUATE QUANTITIES, THIS SHOULD NOT BE A LONG TERM MAJOR IMPACTOR.
+++++++++HOWEVER, IT WILL CONTINUE TO IMPACT A/C READINESS AND AVAILABILITY,
WITH REGARDS TO DOWN TIME FOR REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT OF THE COMPONENT.
IF NOT PROPERLY MANAGED,
THIS COULD VERY WELL BE THE ITEM THAT HAS THE GREATEST POTENTIAL TO ADVERSELY
AFFECT OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES WHILE DEPLOYED FORWARD. TO DATE THE SYSTEM
HAS IMPACTED 61 A/C, ACCOUNTED FOR 4,161 TOTAL SCIR HOURS, 2,978 HOURS OF NMC
AND 1,183 PMC HOURS, WITH ZERO CANNIBILIZATION ACTIONS.
D. INFRARED
(IR)
SUPPRESSOR PANELS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE:
1. IR SUPPRESSOR RELIABILITY ISSUES ARE A DRIVING CONSIDERATION IN
AIRCRAFT READINESS. PANEL FAILURE AND COANDA/DEFLECTOR TUBE FAILURES ARE
FREQUENT LONG TERM DOWNING DISCREPANCIES.
DAMAGED TUBES LEFT
INSTALLED CREATE A PARTIAL
MISSION
CAPABLE AIRCRAFT, WHEREAS REMOVING THE TUBE IS A DOWNING DISCREPANCY.
CURRENTLY, FRC EAST IS
ATTEMPTING TO REPAIR SEVERAL OF THE LESS
DAMAGED TUBES THEREBY
CREATING A POOL OF RFI TUBES.
TO DATE THE SYSTEM HAS
IMPACTED 157 A/C, ACCOUNTED FOR 57,089 SCIR HOURS, 53,688 HOURS OF NMC AND 3,401
PMC HOURS, WITH 24 CANNIBILIZATION ACTIONS.
2. IRS PANEL
MODIFICATIONS ARE FORTHCOMING WITH TWO RETROFIT KITS PER
MONTH SCHEDULED STARTING IN JULY 2007.
IRS PANELS ARE
EXPERIENCING 14 DIFFERENT DISCREPANCIES, OF WHICH SIX WILL BE ADDRESSED OR
MITIGATED BY THIS MODIFICATION.
IN THE MEANTIME, SQUADRONS
HAVE RECENTLY USED DEPOT LEVEL
ARTISANS THROUGH THE P&E PROCESS TO DEVELOP LIMITED REPAIR CAPABILITY.
P&E REPAIR PROCESS
TAKES BETWEEN SEVEN AND FOURTEEN DAYS.
DESIRED IMMEDIATE REMEDIES
INCLUDE CREATING IRS PANEL REPAIR KITS
CONTAINING ALL REQUIRED
FASTENERS AS WELL AS DEPOT PRODUCED STIFFENERS, CREATING AND MAINTAINING A
SUPPLY OF SPARE IRS PANELS AND OBTAINING A SUPPLY OF SPARE COANDA/DEFLECTOR
TUBES.
E. PITCH CONTROL
LINK (PCL) BEARINGS:
1. MEAN TIME BETWEEN FAILURES OF ROD END BEARING IS
APPROXIMATELY
300 TO 500 FLIGHT HOURS.
REPAIR PROCEDURES
ARE IN PLACE AT MALS-26, SUPPLY LOCATED A LIMITED QUANTITY OF BEARINGS TO REPAIR
PCL*S UNDERGOING REPAIR,
CURRENTLY ZERO ON-HAND IN
THE SYSTEM.
ADDITIONALLY, RECEIVED LIMITED NUMBER OF ROD END ASSEMBLIES (P/N
901-011-441-101 AND 901-011-441-103) FROM THE SYSTEM, WHICH RESULTED IN THE
REPAIR OF ALL BUT TWO PCLS, OF WHICH (01) WAS OUT FOR A NUT THAT HAS SINCE
BEEN REPAIRED ALSO. (71) PCL*S AND (65) ROD ENDS HAVE BEEN REPAIRED SINCE
GAINING CAPABILITY ON 05 APRIL 07.
LIMITED SUPPLY OF BEARINGS
AND/OR ROD ENDS NEGATIVELY IMPACT
REPAIRS. TO DATE PCL ISSUES HAVE IMPACTED 78 A/C AND ACCOUNTED FOR 15,582
TOTAL NMC SCIR HOURS, WITH 24 CANNIBILIZATION ACTIONS.
2.
SHORT
RANGE
MITIGATION EFFORTS INCLUDE ERAC 401 WHICH
REQUIRES A 35 HR INSPECTION TO DETECT WORN PCL*S. LIMITS ARE
.009 INCH WEAR, WHICH EQUATES TO 75% OF THE ORIGINAL BEARING LINER THICKNESS OF
THE OUTER RACE.
IT WAS RECOMMENDED BY FST
TO START FORCED REMOVAL AT
EVERY PHASE. CURRENT SUPPLY POSTURE CANNOT SUPPORT FST RECOMMENDATION, IT
WOULD ALSO ADD IN EXCESS OF TWO DAYS TO EVERY PHASE.
THE ONLY OPTION IS THE
REPAIR OF PCL ON CONDITION, BY REMOVING AND REPLACING THE BEARING OR ROD END
ASSEMBLES.
LONG TERM FIX WILL BE
POSSIBLE REDESIGN OF ROD END AND/OR
REDESIGN OF THE BEARING.
NO WORK AROUND EXIST, DUE
TO THE NATURE OF THE
COMPONENT ONCE OUT OF LIMITS THE A/C IS NOT MISSION CAPABLE UNTIL THE PCL IS
REPAIRED/REPLACED. THIS CREATES A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON A/C READINESS DUE TO
THE PREMATURE FAILURE OF THE BEARINGS WHICH IS COMPOUNDED BY THE DEGRADED SUPPLY
POSTURE.
F. ENGINE AIR
PARTICLE SEPARATOR (EAPS) INSPECTION AND ASSOCIATED QUICK
DISCONNECT:
1. VIBRATION-INDUCED MATERIAL FAILURE OF HARD LINES. RESULTED IN
THE
TEMPORARY RESTRICTION TO EAPS OPERATION. WHICH FLEET WIDE VIBRATION
ANALYSIS OF ALL EAPS PERMITTED ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCEPTABLE AND NOT
ACCEPTABLE EAPS BLOWER MOTOR VIBRATION.
POSSIBLE EAPS UPGRADE AT LEAST ONE YEAR AWAY. ANOTHER ISSUE ASSOCIATED
WITH THIS SITUATION, IS THE SEPARATION OR BACKING OFF OF THE EAPS HYDRAULIC LINE
QUICK DISCONNECT (QD) FITTING.
TO DATE THE SYSTEM HAS
IMPACTED 16 A/C AND ACCOUNTED FOR 2,072 TOTAL PMC SCIR HOURS, WITH ZERO
CANNIBILIZATION ACTIONS. CURRENTLY
01 A/C IS DOWN, OUT OF REPORTING, AS A RESULT OF AN EAPS FIRE FROM A QD
PROBLEM.
2. AN AFB IS CURRENTLY IN PROCESS TO CLEAN EAPS CASE DRAIN QUICK
DISCONNECTS AND PROVIDE PROPER RE-INSTALLATION PROCEDURES.
LIKEWISE, AN ERAC WILL FOLLOW INCORPORATING PROPER INSTALLATION PROCEDURES
INTO THE IETM.
QUICK DISCONNECT PROBLEM
WILL NOT BE TOTALLY ELIMINATED WITH
CURRENT HARDWARE IN USE. REQUEST THAT A REDESIGN OR BETTER, MORE RELIABLE
HARDWARE APPLICATION BE CONSIDERED.
3. ADDITIONAL ITEMS
DISCUSSED ARE AS FOLLOWS, ALTHOUGH THESE ITEMS ARE
STILL OF CONCERN THEY HAVE ADEQUATE SOLUTIONS TO MITIGATE THE IMPACT ON
READINESS, WITH FINAL FIXES IDENTIFIED AND FORTH COMING:
A. NOSE LANDING GEAR
1. VMMT-204 EXPERIENCED SEVEN NOSE LANDING GEAR FAILURES FROM
AUGUST 2000 TO AUG 2005, THREE FAILURES JUNE, AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER OF 2006 AND
ONE IN JUNE 2007. VMM-162 EXPERIENCED THE SAME FAILURE FEBRUARY OF 2007.
FOLLOW-UP INSPECTION OF
ALL AIRCRAFT REVEALED, FIVE OUT OF SEVEN AIRCRAFT WERE OUT OF PROPER RIG.
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDE DEFORMED TORQUE TUBES FROM OVER-TORQUED
SELF-LOCKING NUTS ON THE END FITTINGS.
BINDING IN MOVEMENT OF THE
TORQUE TUBE AT THE TORQUE TUBE END FITTINGS DUE TO DEBRIS IN THE END FITTINGS
AND/OR DEFORMATION OF THE TORQUE TUBES, AND SPRING STRUT NOT RETURNING THE
CENTER BELLCRANK ASSEMBLY TO AN *OVER CENTER* POSITION.
ALL PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED
CONTRIBUTORS WERE CAUSAL FACTORS IN MISALIGNMENT OF THE BELLCRANK ROLLER WITH
THE UPPER TORQUE LINK BRACKET (C-CHANNEL).
THIS MISALIGNMENT PREVENTS
PROPER RETRACTION OF THE NLG DOORS CAUSING THEM TO BECOME *STUCK* ONCE IN THE
CLOSED POSITION. TO DATE THE SYSTEM HAS IMPACTED 32 A/C, ACCOUNTED FOR
7,591 TOTAL SCIR HOURS, 7,503 HOURS OF NMC AND 88 PMC HOURS, WITH 01
CANNIBILIZATION ACTION.
2. NEAR TERM FIX WAS
AN IMPROVED ALIGNMENT PROCEDURE, AS WELL AS REPLACING THE CLAMP BUSHINGS AND
INSTALLING A NEW
BELL
CRANK STOP.
VMM-162 COMPLETED THE VAL/VER AND THE FINAL TD HAS RELEASED. KITS HAVE BEEN
DISTRIBUTED AS WELL AS FOUR TOOL SETS.
THIS PROBLEM REPRESENTS A
SAFETY OF FLIGHT ISSUE WHICH PREVENTS THE EXTENSION OF THE NOSE LANDING GEAR.
EXPEDITIOUS INCORPORATION OF THIS TD IS CRITICAL.
HOWEVER, THERE IS STILL
CONCERN THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF THIS CHANGE MAY INTRODUCE DIFFERENT PROBLEMS.
ALTHOUGH CONTINUED TRAINING AND INSPECTION MAY MITIGATE THIS PROBLEM, ECP 702,
THE NOSE LANDING GEAR
REDESIGN, NEEDS TO BE A HIGH PRIORITY.
B. FUEL SYSTEM
1. BLOCK-B A/C CONTINUE TO EXHIBIT FUELSYSTEM LEAKS DUE TO RUPTURE
DISCS AND FUEL CELL VALVES. FAILUREMODES ASSOCIATED WITH SAID ITEMS DOWN
A/C SOMETIME IN EXCESS OFTHREE DAYS.
THE BIGGEST DEGRADER IS
THE VENT MANIFOLDS,SPECIFICALLY THE BLOWING OF RUPTURE DISKS. THE ORIGINAL
DISCREPANCY, RUPTURING OF THE DISC, IS OFTEN MASKED BY THE FACT THERE'S NONE IN
SUPPLY AND/OR IT'S EASIER
(QUICKER) TO SIMPLY REPLACE THE NHA (VENT MANIFOLD), WHICH HAVE BEEN MORE
PLENTIFUL THAN THE DISC ITSELF. AS IS THE CASE OFTEN TIMES WHEN IT COMES
TO FUEL CELL DISCREPANCIES THERE IS THE REQUIREMENT TO PURGE AND GAS FREE
CERTIFY, WHICH IS AN ENTIRE SHIFT OF NMCM EVEN IF YOU HAVE THE PARTS.
TO DATE THE SYSTEM HAS
IMPACTED 19 A/C, ACCOUNTED FOR 2,763 TOTAL NMC SCIR HOURS, WITH 02
CANNIBILIZATION ACTIONS.
2. THIS
PROBLEM REPRESENTS A SAFETY ISSUE FROM INCREASED CHANCE OF FUEL LEAKS/SPILLS.
NEAR TERM FIX IS TO UTILIZE AN ADJUSTED FUEL LOAD , NOT FUELING A/C TO
ADVERTISED CAPACITY. A MOD TO THE FUEL SYSTEM IS CURRENTLY BEING
INCORPORATED BY THE BOEING FIELD TEAM, NEW AND IMPROVED RUPTURE DISC AND SWEENEY
FEED CELL CHECK VALVE.
EXPEDITIOUS INCORPORATION
OF THE MOD IS CRITICAL, ESPECIALLY AS WE GET CLOSER TO A POSSIBLE SHIPBOARD
DEPLOYMENT FOR VMM-266, AN ENVIRONMENT WHERE PROBLEMS OF THIS NATURE ARE
PARTICULARLY HAZARDOUS.
4. USMC AIRCRAFT
OPERATE IN HARSH ENVIRONMENTS WHICH CHALLENGE OUR MARINES* ABILITY TO
MAINTAIN/REPAIR CRITICAL SYSTEMS AND PROVIDE FULL
MISSION
CAPABLE AIRCRAFT. IN THE CASE OF THE MV-22 THIS CHALLENGE IS EVEN MORE
PREVALENT DUE TO SOME OF THE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH NEW WEAPONS PLATFORMS.
OVER THE PAST 9 MONTHS
V-22 BLOCK A AIRCRAFT READINESS HAS BEEN AN AVERAGE OF 47.8% MISSION CAPABLE AND
34.9% FULL MISSION CAPABLE WHILE BLOCK B AIRCRAFT READINESS HAS BEEN ON AVERAGE
79.3% MISSION CAPABLE AND 62.1% FULL MISSION CAPABLE.
BASED ON THE HISTORICAL
DATA AVAILABLE, THERE IS A REASON FOR CONCERN WITH REGARD TO AIRCRAFT READINESS
AND AVAILABILITY AS OUR BLOCK B AIRCRAFT BEGIN TO REACH THE FLIGHT HOUR
THRESHOLDS WE HAVE ON OUR BLOCK A AIRCRAFT,
THRESHOLDS WE WILL REACH
MORE QUICKLY WITH THE ADDITION OF SUSTAINED HIGH TEMPO OPERATIONS IN OIF.
WITH THIS IN MIND, AND WITH THE ADDED OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES THE OIF ENVIRONMENT
WILL PRESENT, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT CURRENTLY KNOWN PROBLEMS/ISSUES ARE FULLY
UNDERSTOOD, AND SOLUTIONS ARE AGGRESSIVELY PURSURED. FAILURE TO BRING
THESE ISSUES TO CLOSURE QUICKLY WILL RUN THE RISK OF SIGNIFICANTLY IMPACTING
AIRCRAFT MATERIAL CONDITION, REDUCING READINESS, INCREASING SUPPLY COSTS, AND
DEGRADING THE AIRCRAFT'S ABILITY TO SUPPORT THE FULL SCOPE OF OPERATIONAL
MISSIONS AND TASKINGS ONCE IN THEATER.//
______________________________________________
And remember this is not a
"new" aircraft overcoming growing pains. It first flew in 1989,
they've spent $20 billion "fixing" this flawed design over these past
18 years.
Carlton Meyer editorG2mil@Gmail.com
V-22 Scandal
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